The balanced scorecard (BSC) has become a popular concept for performance measurement. It focuses attention of management on only a few performance measures and bridges different functional areas as it includes both financial and non-financial measures. However, doubts frequently arise regarding the quality of the BSCs developed as well as the quality of the process in which this development takes place. This article describes a case study in which system dynamics (SD) modelling and simulation was used to overcome both kinds of problems. In a two-stage modelling process (qualitative causal loop diagramming followed by quantitative simulation), a BSC was developed for management of one organizational unit of a leading Dutch insurer. This research illustrates how, through their involvement in this development process, management came to understand that seemingly contradictory goals such as customer satisfaction, employee satisfaction and employee productivity were, in fact, better seen as mutually reinforcing. Also, analysis of the SD model showed how, contrary to ex ante management intuition, performance would first have to drop further before significant improvements could be realized. Finally, the quantitative modelling process also helped to evaluate several improvement initiatives that were under consideration at the time, proving some of them to have unclear benefits, others to be very promising indeed.
Introduction
Some 2 decades ago, Harvard Professors Johnson and Kaplan renounced conventional financial measures as the right way to control company performance in their book Relevance lost: The Rise and Fall of Management Accounting. 1 Instead, they introduced an integrated set of financial and non-financial measures, which has become known under the label of the balanced scorecard. [2] [3] [4] Since then, performance management in general, and the balanced scorecard (BSC) approach in particular, have risen to prominence in both the business world and in academia. Balanced scorecard concepts are now also studied in several areas of management research, such as organization studies, 5 operations management 6, 7 and information systems. 8 The reasons for this sudden rise to prevalence appear obvious in retrospect. On the one hand, there is the appeal of simplicity: no longer do managers have to work their way through piles of statistics, but can focus on monitoring some 15-20 key indicators instead. On the other hand, there is the strength of interdisciplinarity. In the past, all the relevant inputs from different functional areas had to be translated into financial data. Some functions, such as marketing, may have been significantly better suited to do this than others, such as R&D or operations. But, regardless of how successful this translation was, it remained a conversation in a 'foreign language' 9 for non-financial managers. With a BSC, managers have now a more acceptable common language to discuss issues in.
Despite or perhaps in response to its popularity, the BSC concept has had its share of criticism. Broadly speaking, these criticisms can be seen as the other side of the coin for the before-mentioned advantages of the BSC. Yes, the idea of only a few process indicators that point at key leverage points of the system is very attractive. 10, 11 But, how can one be sure that the few ones selected are indeed the right ones? Should there be more? Or less? And, do they all work in the same direction or might they counteract each other? Moreover, if they are the right variables, what are the correct values to target for? And, within what time frame should these be achieved? From a theoretical perspective, these are not trivial questions. Nor are they, from a practitioner's perspective, trivial to managers implementing a BSC, as we will observe further on. Rather than assume their scorecard was relevant, the managers in the case study we will be describing were eager to go through a rigorous process of questioning its relevance, as in the poem by Robert Graves this article derives its title from.
A comparable weakness is inherent to the apparent advantage of interdisciplinarity of BSCs. If a BSC is to reflect all the different relevant perspectives on the business, then all the stakeholders that represent these perspectives should be actively involved in its development. How else can one be sure that all the relevant viewpoints are represented in the BSC? But then, how does one organize a process in which a group of people with inherently different perspectives, goals and constraints and, indeed, languages, can find agreement upon just a few numbers as the basis for a joint strategy?
In this paper, we suggest that system dynamics (SD) can be an effective way of overcoming these limitations to BSC development. After a brief recapitulation in the next two sections of what BSC and SD entail, we describe the development of a BSC with system dynamics for one of the business units of Interpolis, a leading insurance company in the Netherlands. We introduce the case setting next and then describe how a 'strategy map' 12, 13 of the BSC was developed in close collaboration with the management team. We then outline the SD simulation model that was developed from this map and look at a number of policy experiments that were conducted with this model, which led to further refinements in the final BSC. In the concluding sections we consider limitations of this research and pros and cons of different OR-based approaches for BSC development.
Current BSC theory and practice
The Business scorecard is a performance measurement system introduced by Kaplan and Norton. 2, 3 According to these authors, a BSC addresses shortcomings of traditional performance measurement systems that relied solely on financial measures. To overcome this, Kaplan and Norton introduced three additional measurement categories that cover non-financial aspects. The result is a scorecard that translates the vision and strategy of a business unit into objectives and measures in four different areas:
1. The financial perspective: how the company wishes to be viewed by its shareholders; 2. The customer perspective: how the company wishes to be viewed by its customers; 3. The internal business process perspective: in which processes the company must excel in order to satisfy it shareholders and customers; 4. The organizational learning and growth perspective: which changes and improvements the company must achieve to implement its vision.
The 'balance' of the scorecard is reflected in its mix of lagging (outcome measures) and leading (performance drivers) indicators, and of financial and non-financial measures.
Recently, Kaplan and Norton have developed the notion of a strategy map as a complementary concept next to the BSC. A strategy map links measures of process performance, or key performance indicators (KPIs), together in a causal chain that leads through all four perspectives: measures of organizational learning and growth influence measures of internal business processes, which, in turn, act upon measures of the customer perspective, which ultimately drive financial measures. 12, 13 Causal chains or causal diagrams provide a medium by which people can externalize mental models and assumptions and enrich these by sharing them. [14] [15] [16] [17] In fact, one of the hidden strengths of a balanced measurement framework, in particular of the BSC, may well be that it forces management teams to explore the beliefs and assumptions underpinning their strategy. 18 The BSC concept originates from the USA. There it has been applied successfully across many industries and within the public sector. It has also been delivered to an international audience and on a multi-disciplinary front. 19 For example, Malmi 20 found that the logic of the BSC was appealing to many companies in Finland. Wisniewski and Dickson 21 describe its application to a police force in Scotland. From a functional perspective, researchers from different management fields have made contributions. The management accountancy aspect of the BSC has been considered by, for example, Newing 22 and Nrreklit. 23 Also in the operations management field the BSC is wellknown. 6, 7, 24, 25 From a general strategy perspective, the BSC has been described by for example Mooraj et al, 26 Hudson et al. 27 Partly, the success of the scorecard can be explained by good timing and marketing. Managers were clearly frustrated with traditional measurement systems at the time when the BSC was promoted in the Relevance Lost book by Johnson and Kaplan and in articles in the Harvard Business Review. However, apart from timing, one key strength of the BSC is that its appearance is so agreeably simple. It suggests that with only a few well-balanced numbers one can monitor the performance of an entire company. Another key strength of the BSC concept is that it can serve as a bridge between different fields, both financial and non-financial ones.
Next to the well-published successes of BSC, a number of inherent weaknesses have been reported in the literature. Interestingly, the advantages of the BSC mentioned in the previous paragraph can also be interpreted as disadvantages. If all one has is a small set of indicators, how can one be sure that these are the right ones; can one be assured of their relevance? And, if the BSC development process offers opportunities for bridging different fields, how does one organize this effectively? Regarding the first weakness, it has been stated repeatedly that the BSC concept provides no mechanism for maintaining the relevance of defined measures. 23 Neely et al 6 found that the problem for managers is usually not identifying what could be measured, but reducing the list of possible measures to a manageable (and relevant) set. An additional concern here is that the concept of causality is not in all implementations of BSCs equally well developed. In their more recent work on strategy maps, Kaplan and Norton emphasize the importance of showing how improvements in one area lead to improvements in others. 12 
System dynamics as a modelling method for BSC development
In this article, we suggest the use of system dynamics (SD) as an approach to overcome the limitations to current BSC theory and usage mentioned in the literature. In particular, we suggest a two-stage process of SD modelling for BSC development. We call these two stages the qualitative and the quantitative stage in SD modelling. This distinction is a very common one in SD, see for example, Wolstenholme's overview in the special issue on SD in JORS in 1999. 29 Stage 1: Elicit qualitative mental models from management of perceived interrelationships using causal loop diagramming (CLDs), resulting in a refined version of a 'strategy map'. 12, 13 From this map, distil key performance indicators (KPIs) and assign preliminary targets. Not only is the distinction between qualitative and quantitative modelling a common one in the SD literature, but a two-stage approach as suggested here to system dynamics modelling is also the 'normal' way of conducting system dynamics interventions in organizations. [14] [15] [16] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] In this article, we show how this generic approach can be tailored to support the process of developing BSCs. We will illustrate how this approach yields advantages compared to more 'conventional approaches', advantages that stem from the systematic approach to 'strategy mapping' that SD offers, as well as advantages that originate from the smooth transition from qualitative models to quantified simulation.
Obviously, SD is not the only method available for improving the conventional way in which most scorecards have been developed so far. There are several 'soft OR' methods that offer similar improvements in rigour in the mapping process. 33, 34 In particular, cognitive mapping (SODA) 34 and soft systems methodology 35 come to mind. Both approaches place great emphasis on identifying causal relations between key variables and constructing 'maps' of these. Both these qualitative approaches can be followed up by a more focused quantitative modelling stage. In particular of SODA there have been reports in the literature of modelling efforts where this approach was combined with SD modelling and simulation. [36] [37] [38] Also, both approaches typically employ a process of close collaboration with key problem owners in which maps and models are developed interactively to assure maximal model relevance and client ownership. 34, 35 The other way round, qualitative SD followed by a quantitative stage on the basis of another OR method, also occurs. One published example describes the use of multicriteria analysis, preceded by a first stage of causal loop diagramming. 39 Of course, if SD simulation is deemed most appropriate for the Stage 2 process, a strength of the SD approach becomes that the transition between the causal maps that are developed first and the simulation model to be developed next can be a very smooth and natural one. Problem owners see the same diagrams in the same software package that they used first but now get a 'back-end' to it, equations and graphs which build upon their intuitive grasp of the model after the first stage.
There is one school of thought in operations and strategic management that sets system dynamics apart from all other OR methods for BSC development. Authors such as Warren 40, 41 stress the importance of distinguishing explicitly time delays and accumulations in BSCs. Regarding time delays, some indicators are leading, others are lagging. Changes can be made to inputs and changes can be observed in outputs. 28 In 'conventional' BSCs this distinction in time delays is not made as explicitly and rigorously as in SD models. Regarding accumulations, in the strategic management literature on the resource-based view of the firm, the concept of accumulation as a driving force for firm performance has been stressed repeatedly. 42, 43 Such resources, both tangible and intangible, grow or decline gradually over time, and it is these accumulations that really drive organizational performance according to this literature. Therefore, one should make it clear what those accumulations really are and what drives their behaviour over time. The stocks-and-flows concept in SD addresses both time delays and accumulations in a rigorous manner, while most other BSC and OR methods do so considerably less.
The case study
The case study described in this article concerned a business unit of Interpolis. Interpolis (www.interpolis.nl) is one of the leading insurers in the Netherlands. Since 1990, the company as a whole forms part of the Rabobank organization, one of the three large banking and insurance conglomerates in the Netherlands. Interpolis employs some 6000 people. 2003 revenues were 5 Billion.
The business unit concerned is called Stichting Rechtsbijstand ('Foundation for Legal Aid', abbreviated from here on as 'SRB'). Some 600.000 consumers have insured their needs for judicial aid with this formally independent organization. Some 300 SRB employees provide this aid. Overall, the demand for legal aid continues to increase considerably. In 2003, 68.000 requests for legal aid were noted, which is up 16% from 2002.
In the years prior to our involvement with this company, SRB had gone through a period of considerable upheaval. First, there had been several changes in top management. Secondly, there was the noted and continued significant increase in demand for its services, as a result of changes in the market and new insurance sales policies with its parent, Rabobank. In response, staff hiring had increased significantly, after a long period of little to no growth. Thirdly, the organization had recently undergone a major restructuring, shifting from a regional structure to a structure according to area of judicial expertise. Fourthly and finally, the management team members were almost all less than a year in their current jobs, including the CEO. All in all, the time seemed right for a serious reorientation on key goals for the future.
This was the background against which our involvement with this company should be situated. We, the authors, formed part of a small group of external consultants who facilitated the management team (MT) of this organization in the development of a BSC. This development process was set up in two stages.
During the first stage, preparatory interviews were conducted with MT members, the results of which were discussed in a half-day workshop where the group engaged in a number of causal loop diagramming exercises. The findings from this workshop were summarized in a so-called workbook, 15 which was distributed to the MT members, studied, filled in and sent back by for analysis, leading to input for the next workshop. A simplified and stylized version of the end result of this CLD mapping exercise is shown in Figure 1 and described in the next section. The intermediate causal loop diagrams were discussed in a final full-day workshop. On the basis of these discussions, an intermediate version of a BSC was generated in a fairly straightforward manner. MT members chose those key indicators from the diagram that they felt would enable management to keep a good grasp of key drivers of performance. The resulting list of measures and objectives was discussed, refined, simplified and finally agreed upon. This resulted in the intermediate version of the BSC that is shown in Table 1 .
Perhaps the most important managerial insight that emerged from this stage was that management came to realize how goals that they had first believed to be at odds with each other were, in fact, not mutually exclusive but mutually reinforcing. It was not: choose either for customer satisfaction, or for employee satisfaction or for cost effectiveness, but rather: either we will achieve all three goals or none at all. The key linking concept was employee productivity. Higher productivity does mean greater cost effectiveness, but also greater customer satisfaction, as cases are handled sooner, and greater employee satisfaction, as work pressure is less severe.
At the end of stage 1 there was agreement on the content of the BSC. Equally important, there was also agreement on the approach forward. Especially relevant in the context of the current article is that the team felt pleased with their first BSC, but at the same time was very uncertain about its quality. Were these really the right indicators? Had they been complete? And would these indeed all work towards the same goal? To what extent would the chosen indicators really be sufficient to achieve the overall company mission? On the other hand, could this list of KPI's not be shortened further? After all, the fewer dials to watch the easier it becomes to monitor performance effectively. To address these uncertainties, the team decided that a system dynamics simulation model was to be developed to investigate these questions more thoroughly.
In the second stage of the project we, the authors, developed a quantified simulation model for SRB. We started from the causal loop diagrams and the intermediate BSC that had been developed in the first stage. These were sufficient to develop a first skeleton of an SD model. This skeleton was then filled with key company data, which were delivered by two managers from the MT. These two were more closely involved than the others in the subsequent development of the model, With the calibrated simulation model that was developed in this manner, we conducted a number of analyses that addressed the questions the MT was still grappling with after the first stage. This process led to significant additional managerial insights. first deteriorate further before things would get better. The increase in workload that had been building up the past 2 years would stabilize in the year ahead before it would drop significantly. As a result, setting ambitious targets for especially the first half of the coming year was not appropriate. This was a message that none of the actionoriented managers really liked, but one that was key in managing expectations adequately. A third managerial insight from the simulation effort was that it focused attention on the real leverage points in the company, on those policies that really mattered to performance and away from the ones that were less likely to be high-impact. Among these were, as we will also see further on, the two-edged sword of outsourcing of cases to thirdparties and the mixed blessing of additional staff training. Unexpectedly high benefits were found to result from another policy initiative, which was to install a high-quality case intake process staffed with experienced employees.
All these findings have been discussed with the management team, have been challenged by them, have in some cases been mitigated but nevertheless have broadly been accepted. They have been used to guide the implementation of the BSC approach for the organization as a whole and well as for the various sub-units involved.
Qualitative model structure
A simplified and stylized version of the qualitative model that was the end result of the first modelling phase is shown in Figure 1 . In this causal loop diagram, six interconnected key feedback loops are shown that together determine the dynamic behaviour of the model. These are labelled R1, R2, R3 with the 'R' standing for 'reinforcing' or positive feedback loop, and B1, B2 and B3, the 'B' standing for 'balancing' or negative feedback loop. 16 R1. The work pressure-motivation loop: A pertinent observation the MT made was that, in recent years, work pressure had gone up as a result of increases in requests for legal aid. More work had to be performed by the same people, so work pressure went up. As a result, employee motivation had dropped. Lower motivation leads to more absenteeism, more sick leaves, and, in general, to a reduction in productivity (defined as # cases handled per person per period). Productivity changes affect again the workload, and hence, the work pressure, leading to a vicious cycle of low employee motivation and high work pressure.
R2. Practice breeds perfect-loop: How do employees become more proficient in processing cases? Obviously, by training, but mostly by learning-on-the-job. A law degree does not automatically make one an ideal staff member at SRB. For instance, a solution that is legally quite sophisticated may not be the most desirable option from a client or managerial perspective, as it may require long handling times and a great deal of personal attention. In practice, a quick and straightforward settlement may be preferable. Judgments such as these are best learned on the job. Interestingly, the more cases one has handled, the more proficient and productive one becomes. So, the better one gets, the better one becomes: a clear virtuous cycle of mutually reinforcing experience and productivity.
R3. Employee retention loop: Employees that feel pressurized by high workload are less motivated. Unmotivated employees are more likely to leave than motivated ones. A higher quit rate further reduces the organization's capacity to handle cases, which increases work pressure even more and leads to even more staff turnover. Obviously, this reinforcing loop works the same way as well: happy employees will be more inclined to stay, making work loads better manageable and everybody even more happy. In the former setting, this structure is called a vicious cycle, in the latter the same structure becomes a virtuous one.
B1. Work pressure-hiring loop: Apart from simply waiting until staff becomes sufficiently proficient in handling higher volumes of work, what else can one do? One obvious solution is to hire more people. This is visualized by loop B1, which goes from work pressure to hiring rate, and from there to new staff, to staff available, from there on to case processing rate, to case work load and back again to work pressure. Obviously, this adjustment process takes some time. In the case of SRB, it was estimated that more staff could effectively be hired after some 3 to 6 months. Then, getting them up to speed, that is, become experienced, would take 1-3 years.
B2. Case outsourcing loop: A more short-term fix to high workload levels was to outsource part of the caseload to outside firms. This reduces work pressure immediately. How much was to be outsourced was a point of debate. One obvious reason was that this was expensive. Another, more subtle one, was that every case outsourced was a learning opportunity missed, in the logic of loop R2.
B3. Customer satisfaction loop: Perhaps in theory most powerful balancing loop was the one involving the customer. If, as a result of high workloads, processing times become very long and other aspects of performance deteriorate likewise, consumers may decide that they are better off switching to another insurer. However, in the reality of SRB at that time, this was definitely not an immediate concern. Most people will ask for legal aid very infrequently, and even then handling speed would only be one of many drivers of customer satisfaction.
These six feedback loops describe most, but not all the variables and links in the diagram. In particular, they do not fully address the three specific managerial policies that were being considered by the MT at that time, and that found their way into the intermediate BSC. The first one (labelled as P1 in the diagram) was to strongly increase the target for outsourced cases, so as to relieve workloads immediately, and help reverse the employee retention loop from a vicious into a virtuous cycle. The second proposed policy was to train new staff better and hence to boost the company's ability to handle higher workloads of cases. Obviously, when employees are on training they cannot be handling cases at the same time, so this increase in training would come at the expense of staff availability.
Finally, there was a plan to improve the quality of the case intake process dramatically, so that every new case would be allocated to precisely the right person in the organization, as these differed widely in skill levels, fields of experience, hobby's, work style and the like. This was a job that would require the refined judgment of experienced staff, who were at the same time badly needed for handling cases. So, every policy had its potential downside, and from the conceptual discussions during Stage 1 of the modelling process it became clear that quantification would be needed to provide final answers.
Quantitative model structure
In the second stage of the BSC definition, a quantified SD simulation model of the insurance company was developed. In this section, the structure of this model is described. As a results of reasons of confidentiality and size, we will not describe the model in full detail. The quantitative relationships between variables are not given in this paper. However, the full model (with fictitious numbers) is available from the authors upon request.
The simulation model is based on the causal loop diagrams described above. Quantified system dynamics modelling asks for specification of the main flows and accumulations, or stocks, in the system. In this case, the two main flows are the processing of cases and the flow of employees. The most important stocks are, for the first flow, cases being processed and, for the second flow, employees, both new and experienced. These two main flows are drawn in Figures 2 and 3 . The causal loops connect these two main flows in various ways. In the next paragraphs the contents of the model are explained.
Flow of cases
The legal aid that SRB provides can only be supplied after a so-called intake process. In this process it is decided whether the request for legal aid of a customer can be given by the company. When the intake is accepted, a specific customer file (a 'case' in legal terms) is made and this case is allocated to an employee for further processing. Occasionally, when employees are too busy, a case can be outsourced. When the intake is rejected, the request of the customer is discarded without further processing taking place. This flow of cases is represented in stocks-and-flows notation 16 in Figure 3 .
Flow of employees Figure 3 shows the employee flow for new and experienced employees. This distinction is necessary because both turnover rates and productivity differ for new and experienced employees. New employees become experienced after a certain assimilation time. More experience means higher productivity. So, the productivity of experienced employees is considerably higher than that of new employees. However, experienced employees are also needed to train new employees. The time that experienced employees 'lose' decreases their productivity, defined as the number of cases that they can handle per period. These two main flows, cases and employees, interact in many ways. Most of the feedback loops that were described in the preceding section link these two parts of the model. For instance, loop R3 states that higher workload (flow of cases) leads to more work pressure and hence to more employee turnover (flow of employees). Loop B1 says that higher case load (flow of cases) and more work pressure lead to more aggressive hiring (flow of employees). Quantification of most of these loops is straightforward for a trained SD model builder. One exception is loop R2, the 'practice breeds perfect' loop. In more specific terms, this part of the model calculates productivity. It is based on learning curve theory, in which experience is linked with productivity. For our calculations, we referred to the model provided by Sterman, 16 p 507). His key definition is:
Average Experience of either experienced or new employees is the total experience (expressed in working years) divided by the number of experienced or new employees. Experience can be gained through processing of cases, but experience can also be lost. People forget relevant knowledge and new developments in the insurance sector cause experience to become obsolete. This is expressed in the model by an experience decay rate. Furthermore, experience is also lost when employees leave the company. Reference Productivity is the productivity attained at the Reference Experience level. For example, in the simulation model Reference Experience is about 7 working years for experienced employees and 0.2 working years for new employees. Reference Productivity for experienced employees is almost double the reference value for new employees. The exponent c in the computation of the productivity determines the strength of the learning curve and is equal to
where f p is the fractional change in productivity per doubling of effective experience. 12 
Model analysis
The simulation effort was conducted because the team was insecure about the quality of the balanced scorecard that had been developed on a qualitative basis. After quantification, what were the lessons learned? One overall conclusion was that the performance indicators that had been selected were broadly speaking the right ones, but that the chosen performance improvement indicators were not straightforwardly positive. So, aspects such as employee productivity, throughput time, customer and employee productivity and employee turnover rates were indeed confirmed to be key drivers of performance, also in the quantitative version of the model. Figure 4 shows the behaviour over time for some of the key performance indicators identified. This graph partly replicates history and partly predicts future behaviour, as the modelling effort took place towards the end of Year 2. Although precise time series data were missing for the two preceding years, behaviour was found to be broadly in line with available knowledge of past performance. The gradual build-up of work pressure over time is clearly visible, and the increases in throughput time that are the logical consequence of that as well. Less straightforward but quite explainable is the gradual decrease of employee productivity (measured in Cases per Employee per Year, so C/(E/Y)). As there had been a considerable increase of new and inexperienced staff and productivity of new staff is only around half of that of experienced staff, average productivity would have to drop.
Overall performance: gradual progress, but first worse-before-better What Figure 4 also shows is that progress would not be made immediately. For the first half of Year 3, the model predicted that performance would still become somewhat worse, and that only around the start of Year 4 work pressure and throughput times would have gone down significantly. So, the good news was that a turnaround appeared to be in the making; the bad news was that SRB was not quite there yet. This finding resulted for management in the uncomfortable recommendation of setting performance targets for the first quarters of the coming year not higher but lower than last year's performance, which is not a natural inclination of most managers.
Existing policies insufficient for swift progress Figure 4 shows performance with existing policies. These included policies for hiring new staff. So far, those had been mainly reactive: when work pressure went up, more employees were hired. This also becomes apparent from Figure 5 , where some key performance indicators for the flow of employees are visualized. From this graph it is clear that there are several delays involved. When it is finally noted that work pressure is structurally increasing, it still takes some time before employees are actually hired and then even longer before they become productive and the effect of hiring them becomes visible. For example, in Year 0 the total number of employees was 207. In Year 3 this number was estimated at 330. Between Year 0 and 3 throughput time and work pressure (see Figure 4) were still increasing.
Unclear benefits from proposed policies
The rate of improvement with existing policies was hard to swallow for management. What could be done to speed up progress? One obvious remedy was to outsource more cases. The system dynamics model showed that indeed, in the short term, outsourcing has a positive effect on work pressure, as shown in Figure 6 . In Year 2, almost 15% of all cases are outsourced and, indeed, between Years 1 and 2 work pressure is somewhat lower than in the scenario of no outsourcing. However, after Year 3, work pressure becomes slightly higher in the outsourcing scenario. This is because, when cases are outsourced, employees cannot gain experience from those cases, and in the long run these missed opportunities have a negative effect on their productivity and, consequently, on work pressure.
This experiment showed that outsourcing might well be a two-edged sword. When applied selectively to special settings (one example included a department with very experienced staff, so with limited learning opportunities, but a very high case load and a tight job market), outsourcing could work well to alleviate short-term pressures. However, when applied too lavishly it might be counter-productive in the long run. So, it was considered better not to make '% outsourced' a KPI in itself.
There was a similar story to tell for the policy of increased staff training. More staff training would improve productivity and motivation, but it would also reduce the time available to learn from handling real cases. Again, this proposed policy was found to have unclear benefits and was therefore removed from the BSC.
Unexpected leverage from a counter-intuitive policy
The importance of employee productivity had been repeatedly stressed and confirmed. The crucial importance of experienced staff for overall performance had also been noted several times. As more and more junior staff would come on board, the higher productivity of the experienced employees would be all the more a strategic asset. So, an initiative that would limit the time that experienced staff could spend on handling cases could well be labelled as 'counter-intuitive'. And yet, this was what the initiative of the high-quality case intake process was all about.
When new cases come in, they have to be evaluated and assigned to specific staff members. Experienced employees not only can 'read' a case very early on, they are also familiar with the strengths and weaknesses, preferences and dislikes of their fellow staff members. When more experienced employees are involved in the intake process, it is likely that the fit between cases and employees will improve. The better this fit, the higher employee satisfaction becomes. This operational measure was tested; the results are shown in Figure 7 . In the base case, 50% of the intake of cases is handled by experienced employees (and consequently 50% by new employees). In the high-quality intake-scenario, experienced employees do 75% of the intake. Figure 7 shows that this policy has indeed a significant positive effect on work pressure, and consequently also on employee productivity and throughput times.
Discussion
Limitations: modelling of 'mental models', not of the 'real world'
There are many limitations to the study we could mention and discuss in this section, for instance that since it reports on a single case, generalizability of findings is problematic. One limitation that is specifically relevant in this case is the distinction one has to make between modelling 'mental models' and modelling 'the real world'. The process that the Interpolis management team went through focuses on making explicit the mental models of the individual managers, on sharing them, on challenging their internal consistency and on aligning them. What this approach did not aim or claim to do is to model the 'real world', independent of what the managers' perception of this real world was. The philosophical dimension of this distinction we will not solve in this article, as this goes back all the way to Plato's cave and there still remain two camps of academics: those who insist that all models are social constructions of reality and those who believe that there are at the very least significant elements of objectivity in all social system models. 34, 44 Fortunately, the practical side to this limitation is easier resolved than the philosophical one. We stress that developing a rigorous model of real-world business processes Figure 6 Effect of outsourcing on work pressure. Figure 7 The effect of installing a high-quality intake process.
through direct observation is a laudable, but fairly timeconsuming process. The approach that we have presented here is intended to supplement a strategic decision-making process. So, the fair comparison to be made is not between the model that one develops through the process we have outlined and some theoretical 'optimal' model. Rather, one should set a BSC development approach informed by system dynamics against a conventional approach of developing BSCs and then see if the benefits of using SD outweigh the drawbacks.
The added value of system dynamics to BSC development Management of SRB and Interpolis has remained quite positive about the process described in this article. Generally speaking, the future has unfolded pretty much as had been predicted during the modelling effort. So, after an initial period of seemingly little progress in performance, in fact of further deterioration of throughput times, considerable improvements in operation could be noted, especially in the second half of the year. To what extent was this due to the use of the system dynamics approach? This is a question that is difficult to answer objectively, but SRB management did indicate that both the causal diagramming workshops and the simulation effort had had clear added value for them. So, some kind of causal diagramming exercise seems worthwhile. Obviously, this is pretty much what Kaplan and Norton themselves have been stressing recently with their notion of 'strategy maps'. And, as observed earlier on, there are other mapping techniques such as SODA and SSM that one could employ equally well. We do not see a distinctive 'competitive advantage' to the use of SD here, rather an approach that is in line with current best practice in BSC development.
The use of simulation modelling, and SD simulation in particular, is far less frequently attempted in BSC development and yet yielded considerable additional insights in this case. In particular, the quantification effort helped to be focused on the importance of a good appreciation of time delays and accumulations. The MT found it essential to recognize that adjusting to the sharp increase in customer demand took a significant amount of time, and that the case load that had accumulated over the past few years would not disappear overnight, even when staffing levels would be in line with current demand rates.
It is doubtful if understanding the importance of delays and accumulations, for which SD seems eminently suited, is essential in all BSC development settings. Certainly, this single case cannot prove that. But, in general, one would expect that specific problem settings ask for specific tools. The case of Santos et al 39 describes a setting where multicriteria analysis seemed most appropriate at the end of a qualitative modelling stage where SD was applied. We hope that, in the future, BSC development practitioners will continue to 'mix and match' methods where appropriate, and use screwdrivers for screws, hammers for nails, rather than regarding everything as a nail since all they have is a hammer.
Conclusion
Some 2 decades ago, balanced scorecard pioneers Johnson and Kaplan 1 stated that conventional management accounting deserved the label 'Relevance lost'. As an alternative, they introduced the concept of the BSC, in which the organization tries to focus on a small number of truly relevant indicators to monitor and improve performance. This article has looked at a setting of BSC development for management of one business unit of the Dutch insurer Interpolis. These managers found the BSC concept helpful to arrive at a list of financial and non-financial performance measures, which they saw as the most important ones. However, they were uncertain if these were really the right measures to monitor. Rather than assuming that their scorecard was correct, this management team went through a system dynamics-based approach that was both thorough and practically feasible to question the relevance of the measures it contained.
The use of system dynamics has proved to be very beneficial in this process. The use of causal diagramming was very instrumental during the first stage of modelling in identifying key variables and their causal interrelations. The use of SD simulation modelling was essential in arriving at a proper appreciation of the importance of time delays and accumulations in the key business processes of handling legal cases and of attracting and retaining employees.
System dynamics remains, from the palette of systems interventions available, the technique that, in terms of quantitative modelling, has from the onset been developed to 'boldly go where no one has gone before' in areas where reliable data and theoretical models are lacking but nevertheless the need for simulation, for scenario analysis, is clearly apparent. Surely, balanced scorecard development fits this description well. Although other techniques and approaches will be more appropriate in some cases, SD remains a good choice to test for relevance in a wide variety of BSC development settings.
